Single Question. Whether Divine Worship or the Honor of Divine Worship is due to Christ only as to his Divine Nature

1. About the ninth distinction I aska whether divine worship or the honor of divine worship is due to Christ only as to his divine nature.

a.a [Interpolation] About the ninth distinction, where the Master deals with and inquires whether Christ’s flesh should be worshiped, the question asked...

2. That it is: ‘Worship is cult due to the supreme Lord alone’ [Master Lombard 3 d.9 ch.un. n.1], by reason of supreme lordship; but Christ is supreme Lord only in his divine nature;     therefore etc     .

3. Further, Christ adored [God] in his human nature, because ‘he prayed’;     therefore in his human nature he had a superior, and so the conclusion is gained.

4. Further, however much the human nature is united to the Word, it is in itself a creature and does not exceed the limits of a creature; therefore the cult due to Christ in that nature should not exceed the cult due to any creature; divine cult does exceed it; therefore etc     .

5. Further on Psalm 98.5 ‘Adore his footstool’ the Gloss says, ‘Not with the adoration that is due to God alone.’

6. Further, only that is to be worshipped in this way which is to be loved above all things, because the same thing and in the same nature is supreme Lord and the ultimate end of all things; but Christ is to be supremely loved only in his divine nature, because only in his divine nature is he the supreme Good and the ultimate end;     therefore etc     .

7. To the contrary are the authorities adduced by the Master.

I. To the Question

8. Here three things must be considered: first how divine worship is taken; second how what is due is due; three to whom it is due, and to Christ in what nature it is due.

A. How Divine Worship is taken

9. On the first point. - Just as to revere someone in an inner act is to reckon one’s own goods little in respect of the goods of the one revered and to reckon the revered person’s goods great, and just as this is an act of virtue - so to go to the limit in one’s heart in reckoning the goodness of another to be supreme with respect to one’s own good, and for that other to be the one from whom he who magnifies him has the totality of his own good, is indeed a laudable act provided it have an object fitting the two features mentioned, namely that it be an object whose goodness exceeds the goodness of the one who reveres and that it be that from whom the reverer receives whatever goodness he has.

10. This reverence in interior act has regard only to God as to its fitting object - to God as being supreme good and supreme Lord.a

a.a [Interpolation] and so this reverence is to be shown to God alone.

11. To this interior act there correspond certain exterior acts that are signs of the interior act - namely, in the case of each Law [new and old], certain sacrifices or rites (as genuflections), which profess that this reverence is given to the supreme Lord, and that supreme Lordship exists in him to whom such acts are exhibited, and that subjection to him exists in the one who exhibits them.

12. From these frequently elicited interior and exterior acts there is generated a habit that inclines one to eliciting such acts easily and promptly; and just as such acts were good when possessed of their due circumstances, so the habit that comes from such acts when frequently elicited is itself good.

13. The name therefore of ‘divine worship’ can be taken in two ways: in one way for the worship or reverence shown to God in an interior act, by reason of God being supreme Lord or supreme Goodness, and for the reverence shown to God in an exterior act - or in another way for the habit that inclines one to such acts. And since this habit is consonant with reason it is a virtue - and not a theological virtue, because it does not have the uncreated Good for immediate object but rather the honor to be paid to the uncreated Good; it is therefore a moral virtue, and it is contained most of all under justice whereby that is rendered to a superior which is due to him, according to Augustine City of God 19.21.“Justice, further, is the virtue which bestows on each that which belongs to him. Is that then man’s justice which takes man himself from God and subjects him to unclean demons? Or is that man just who removes himself from God his master, by whom he was made, and serves malign spirits? So where man does not serve God, what of justice must there be thought to be in him?” ⁸⁹

14. The question here is not about the virtue of divine worship but about the act, because the offering or the debt does not belong to the virtue but to the act, the act that generates virtue or is elicited by virtue, because this act is immediately in our power.

B. When and How Divine Worship is due

15. As to the second point [n.8], when and how this debt should be paid, I say that the command to do this act is an affirmative one; for it is reasonable that the intellectual creature be obligated to acknowledge his supreme Lord sometimes and to revere him, City of God 10.1; and this precept, like other affirmative precepts, is always binding but not binding at all times.

16. It can be supposed indeed that the obligation to perform this act belongs to the first precept of the first table [the Decalogue, Exodus 20.3, 5], ‘Thou shalt have no alien gods etc.’ This precept is not merely negative, prohibiting worship to be shown to anything it does not fit, but affirmative, that the true God should be held and worshiped as Lord. This is well expressed in Deuteronomy 6.13, and it is cited by the Savior, Matthew 4.10, ‘Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God and him only shalt thou serve.’ Here a positive precept about worship is set down, together also with exclusion of worship and service shown to another, just as also idolatry is forbidden in the first quotation, ‘Thou shalt not worship alien gods.’

17. Now it is impossible that this affirmative precept be always prevented from being carried out, as if an opportune time for doing what is commanded should never arise - as it might arise in the case of the precept ‘Honor they father and mother;’ for it is possible that an opportune time necessary for honoring parents should never arise, and so this precept could always be kept without transgression even if no act of the precept should ever be done; for the obligation to do the act is only for when an opportune time arises. But nothing could permanently prevent an opportune time arising for worshiping God; and so every adult is simply bound at some time to perform an act of this affirmative precept.

18. At the time of the Mosaic law a determinate time for carrying out this precept seems to have been given in the third commandment, ‘Keep holy the Sabbath day.’ But it was also a precept of the natural law, namely that at some determinate time a man should refrain from servile works; and the observation of the precept did not consist in this negative refraining alone, but in a positive act, namely in an act of ‘keeping holy’, that is, in a greater magnifying of God.

19. Now in the time of the Gospel law this worship, which is to be shown to God in the keeping holy of the Sabbath, is determined as to be done on the Lord’s day - and determined also as to the act by which it must be done, namely in the oblation of the supreme sacrifice, that is, the Eucharist, which the priest must offer for himself and for the people. And the people too make offering in this oblation, namely in a spiritual way, since they are bound ‘to hear the whole mass on the Lord’s day,’ according to the decree ‘Masses’ [Gratian p.3 d.1 ch.64]. And if some necessity excuse one from performing the act that the Church has determined, then one must fulfill it in some equivalent act, namely that (as regards the divine worship specifically deputed) some act be done that is referred directly to God and to reverence of him.

20. But as to whether anyone is bound to carry out this precept, namely to do some act of worship, at any other time besides the time determined - first in the law of nature and afterwards in the Mosaic law and now in the Gospel law on the Lord’s day - it seems that it is so, as on the great feast days during the year, as in the decree ‘Who on a solemn day,’ and ‘Of consecration’ and ‘One must pronounce’ [Gratian p.3 d.1 ch.66]. But if this is doubtful, yet it is certain that some worship at least on those days does seem it should be performed.

C. Whether Divine Worship is due to Christ only as to his Divine Nature

1. Solution

21. As to the third article, where the question is asked whether divine worship is due to Christ only as to this divine nature, I say that the word ‘only’ can be taken in two ways, namely categorematically or syncategorematically.

I concede that in the first way the answer is yes, that a sufficient reason for Christ to be supremely adored only exists in him considered as to his divine nature.

22. But if the term is taken syncategorematically, then it marks, in respect of one extreme, an exclusion from the other extreme. I here draw a distinction, because the exclusion can be either from the term or object of the adoration or from the reason for adoring.

23. In the first way I say that Christ is not to be divinely adored only as to his divine nature, for the human nature should not so be excluded from the term of the adoration that, by this exclusion, the whole could not be adored. The point is made by Damascene (Orthodox Faith ch.54, or 3.8), “Christ, perfect God and perfect man, whom, with the Father and the Holy Spirit, we adore in a single adoration along with his uncontaminated flesh, a flesh that we deny is incapable of being adored; for what has come to exist in the single hypostasis of the Word is adored in that very hypostasis.” And a little later, “The one person of the Word of God, to which his two natures are reduced.” And he then gives an example, “I fear to touch the wood because of the fire present in it.” In this authority from Damascene the ‘with’ [in the phrase ‘with his uncontaminated flesh’] is taken associatively and not copulatively, so that the sense is, ‘we adore the Word with the flesh, that is, the Word having flesh united to him,’ and not, ‘with the flesh, that is, we adore the flesh as well,’ where the proposition is copulative and the flesh is considered as ‘flesh’ and not as ‘united to the deity.’ So ‘flesh’ should not be excluded from the object or term of adoration in this way, although flesh is not the reason for the adoration.

24. There is an example of this from a king and the king’s purple garment, for though the king is to be adored because of himself and in himself, yet he is to be adored along with the purple he is wearing; and just as the purple is not the cause of the adoration, so the flesh is not adorable in the Word such that it is the reason in the Word for the adoration. Another example is taken from a whole and its parts: if I revere a man because of his wisdom and virtues, I revere the whole of him, namely his body and soul, and do not exclude the body from the person I revere; likewise, when I adore a whole man, I do not adore his head by itself to the exclusion from adoration of the other parts.

25. In the second way [n.22], namely where the ‘only’ excludes something from being the reason for adoring, one can say that Christ is to be adored only as to his divine nature, to the exclusion of some other nature as the reason for adoring; for no other nature is the reason for supreme lordship, and so no other nature is the reason for the adoration due to the supreme Lord, just as neither is the body the reason for adoring someone who is virtuous.

2. An Objection, and Rejection of it

26. But an objection to this [n.25] is that supreme lordship is not immediately consequent to the divine nature, because, according to Augustine On the Trinity 5.16 n.17, God was Lord only in time, just as the creature was servant in time; therefore supreme lordship exists by reason of the creation, whereby the creature received its whole being from God. But as great a reason for lordship seems to belong to God because of the gift of redemption as because of the gift of creation;     therefore the cult of divine worship is due to the Redeemer as Redeemer, and by reason of the redemption, in the same way as it is owed to the Creator by reason of creation.

27. This supposition about the equality of lordship in Creator and Redeemer with respect to the created and redeemed is proved in several ways:

First from the Apostle in Galatians 6 [I Corinthians 6.20], ‘For you were bought at a great price; so glorify etc     .’ Therefore I am a servant for the reason that I am redeemed.a

a.a [Interpolation] The question is whether adoration is due to God because of something intrinsic to God in himself or because of a benefit conferred on us or an intrinsic good qua communicated to us. If the second, the question is whether the adoration due by reason of redemption is equally as great as the adoration due by reason of creation.

28. There is also this confirmation from Gregory in the canticle of blessing the paschal candle, ‘Had it not benefited us to be redeemed, it did not benefit to us to be born;’ as great a good, then, is conferred by redemption as by creation.

29. There is another confirmation, too, in that by redemption is conferred the gift of grace and glory, but by creation only the good of nature;     therefore etc     .

30. Herefrom the conclusion is drawn that, since Christ was redeemer as to his human nature, then the same adoration that is owed also to the Creator is owed to Christ according to his human nature, that is, according to the reason for adoring (not absolutely, but as it was the reason for redemption).

31. I reply that, although no one can be bound to something greater than what is greatest, yet he can, for some reason, be bound to the same thing for a more reasons. An example from a religious who vows chastity and afterwards receives sacred orders: he is bound to the same thing and not to a greater thing, but he is bound to it for a greater reason. In this way one can concede that to be the principle of redemption, or to perfect that very redemption - provided that it confers as great a good on us as creation - does, as a result, demand as much service from us by the work of redemption as by the work of creation. And then he who principally works redemption is, as to the reason itself for adoration, owed supreme adoration; but he is not owed a greater adoration than he is owed by reason of creation, because supreme adoration is owed to him by creation.

32. And this point is true: if some good conferred on a creature, and not the intrinsic good itself of the conferrer, is the reason for worshipping the conferrer as Lord (as, for example, if, per impossibile, there were several gods and one of them created us but not another, and if we were bound to adore the first and not the second) - then one could well say that, if as great a good is conferred on us by the working of redemption as by creation, then as much service is owed by reason of this redemption to the whole Trinity (which works the redemption) as is owed to the Trinity by reason of creation;a and it is plain that these reasons for owing adoration to the Trinity are distinct.

a.a [Interpolation] But if the intrinsic goodness of the conferrer is the only reason for such supreme adoration, then, since there is as much intrinsic goodness in one god as in the other, the first should be adored only as the other is.

33. But if the supreme intrinsic goodness of God is the reason for adoration then, since this goodness is not different according to the different goods conferred on creatures, there are not several reasons for adoring God -however many the benefits are that he confers on us.

34. So if this second position is maintained [n.33], then the argument applied to Christ as redeemer [n.30] does not hold, because the nature in which the work of redemption was carried out does not have infinite intrinsic goodness -however much it may be the reason or the principle of conferring on us a very great good.

35. But if the first position is maintained [n.32], namely that it is not just the intrinsic good or intrinsic goodness that is the reason for adoration, but rather this goodness as it communicates the greatest good to us (and this primarily and freely of itself and not because of some return of payment, according to Psalm 15.2, ‘Thou hast no need of my goods’) - then one can reply that, although Christ was Redeemer according to his human nature, yet he did not effect redemption principally according to that nature, but rather the whole Trinity did; and so Christ as man effected only by way of merit the salvation that has been conferred on us by redemption. But supreme reverence is not owed to one from whom we possess the supreme good, not principally, but secondarily.

II. A Doubt about the Adoration owed to Christ as he is a man

36. But there remains a doubt here: what adoration is owed to Christ as he is a man such that the nature, in which he performed the works of redemption as meritorious cause of our salvation, is the reason for the adoration?

A. The Opinion of Others

37. And if it be said that the adoration is hyperdulia (which is the highest reverence due to a creature), there are many arguments to the contrary:

38. First, that this reverence of hyperdulia is due absolutely to Christ as to the nature whereby, even had he not redeemed us, he was full of grace; so a greater reverence is due to him now when, as Mediator in that nature, he has redeemed us.

39. Again, Christ in that nature is head of the Church, according to Augustine, commentary on John 15.1, ‘I am the vine’ - therefore he has to infuse grace into the whole Church; therefore the whole Church is more especially beholden to him than if he were not head and did not have to infuse grace. But if he had only the amount of personal grace he does have, then, even though he would not be head, he would still be owed supreme hyperdulia; therefore a greater reverence now is due to him.

40. Further, a reason that some posit as to why man could not have been repaired by a pure creature is the following, that then man would not have been perfectly restored to the excellence that he had before, because he would be bound to serve that creature and not God alone as he is now; therefore the repairer had to be God. - This reasoning would not be conclusive if Christ was to be adored only with the adoration of hyperdulia; for man could very well have been restored to his former excellence so as to be held to adore God alone with the adoration of latria and to adore that other mediator with the adoration of hyperdulia; but man would not be held to adore that other mediator with adoration of hyperdulia if Christ now in his human nature is to be adored by reason of no other adoration than hyperdulia; therefore man should not now adore him only in this way.

41. Again Anselm, Why God Man 2.14, proves that the life of the man Christ was better than all the sins were evil, or could be evil, that were not sins against God or the person of God. But Anselm is speaking of the created life that Christ was deprived of by death, because he says that his killing is a graver sin than all other sins that are not committed immediately against God; for it was more detestable, according to Anselm, to deprive the man Christ of life than to commit any other sin; but in the case of any sin the will is turned away from the supreme Good; therefore it was more detestable to take away the life of the man Christ than to turn away, by any other sin, from the supreme Good (unless one turns immediately away from this Good). Therefore too Christ’s life was more to be loved than the supreme created good, and so it was to be adored as an infinite good.

42. Or one can argue from the words of Anselm in this other way, that if Christ’s life was as great a good as the privation of it was an evil, and if the privation of it was a greater evil than all the evils, even infinite evils, that there could be, then that evil was worse than all the other infinite evils; therefore the good opposed to it was the infinite Good; therefore Christ in his human nature is owed the adoration of latria that is owed to the infinite Good.

B. Scotus’ own Response

43. As to this article then [n.36], it can be said that a reason for giving latria can be the intrinsic goodness of the one adored or this goodness as communicating itself to the one adoring (and its doing so first, freely and principally, and in accord with the greatest good of the one adoring). Likewise too a reason for the adoration of hyperdulia can be the intrinsic goodness of the one adored or this goodness as through it (as through a second cause) the greatest good is communicated to the one adoring.

44. If the first way is held then for neither cause is there due to Christ in his human nature an adoration because of his being redeemer greater than were he not redeemer; but, according to this opinion, neither is a greater latria, or a latria for an additional reason, due to God if he is Creator than would be due to him if he were not Creator.

45. But if the other opinion is held, then, it can be said of hyperdulia just as of latria in respect of God that a greater reverence is due to Christ because he is redeemer than would be due to him if he were not redeemer (and this if the reverence then due to him were not the greatest reverence) - or if the reverence were the greatest, the same reverence would be due to him now for an additional reason.

46. And this is what the arguments seem to prove [nn.38-42].

47. The fact is plain about the first argument [n.38] because it proceeds of Christ as he is mediator and meritorious cause of our salvation; and plain about the second one [n.39] because it proceeds of Christ as he is head of the Church.

48. The other two [nn.40-42] reasons, which proceed from authorities, need solving.

As to the third argument [n.40], about the perfect repair of man - it concludes by way of congruity that the person who redeemed and meritoriously saved was God, so that we owe the supreme hyperdulia that is owed by reason of meritorious redemption to the same person to whom we also owe, by reason of creation, the adoration of latria; but we would, for this reason, not have been less perfectly saved if we were obliged to show the reverence due a meritorious savior, as he is meritorious savior, to someone other than him to whom we owe latria; just as now we adore Mary with hyperdulia and all the other saints with dulia, and yet we are not lower down because of this adoration than if God alone were to be adored; we would however be very low down if we owed to someone else the adoration we owe to God, because then we would be wholly subject to that someone else, which would prove a great unhappiness and weakness for us. An example of this is that it is more fitting for my father to care for me than for someone else do so in such wise that I would owe him the same reverence that is owed to my father and carer; but if someone else were to be carer, I would owe one sort of reverence to my father and another sort to that someone else, and so I would in some way be subject to several persons, but not with an equal subjection.

49. To the other argument [n.41] I say that the created life of the man Christ was not an infinite good formally, nor was it something to be supremely loved - hence the Trinity wanted it not to die the death it wanted it to die; but, to turn away from God in one thing is graver than to turn away from him in some other thing, and the graver the more noble the turning toward him would be, other things being equal. Now by loving this human nature in Christ, which was the best creature as to fullness of grace, there could be the supreme turning toward God that happens by act of using a creature, because this creature was closest to the end and most able to be referred to the end; therefore a turning away from God with respect to this usable object, namely by hating the created life in him whom God wished to hate it, was the worst turning away - and thus the killing of the man Christ was the gravest sin as far as depends on the object taken as such.

50. And if you say that it was the gravest of all other possible sins not immediately committed against God, one can say that since these other sins are distinct in their gravity, and one of them does not intensify the other, the gravity of this one sin was greatest as to its intensity, but in the others it was greatest as to extent. However the created life of Christ was so good that its being taken way would suffice to destroy infinite evils (there will be discussion of this below in the topic of the satisfaction of Christ for our sins [Lectura 3 d.20 nn.24, 28]).

III. To the Principal Arguments

51. To the first principal argument and to the second and third [nn.2-4] I say that they are conclusive when the ‘alone’ is taken syncategorematically [n.21] and excludes everything else from the divine nature as from the reason for adoration; and so it excludes the human nature, for if the human nature were a reason for the adoration of latria, it would, when separated from the Word, be a reason for the same adoration - which is false according to Augustine in the text; for if the nature were separated from the Word I would not serve this man with this sort of service.

52. This too is how the gloss on the Psalm should be expounded [n.5]; or it can be expounded of the flesh itself as total term of adoration, so that adorers stop there in considering and adoring it.

53. To the last argument [n.6], whoever says that the intrinsic goodness of what is supreme is the reason for adoration, he would concede the minor. And the minor can be distinguished just as the principal conclusion can [nn.22-25]; and the way that a positive response to the question can be conceded [nn.23-24], the minor is true and the conclusion likewise true; and the way that a negative response to the question is given [n.25], the minor is false. But anyone who held that the reason for adoration is supreme Goodness as supremely communicating itself to the adorer [n.35], although he would concede that what is to be supremely adored is to be supremely loved, would not however be held to this conclusion by the argument.

54. But how?

It does seem that Christ in his human nature, that is to say, this totality -not excluding the human nature - is to be supremely loved, just as the totality here is posited as supremely adored when the human is not excluded nature from the term of the adoration [nn.23-24]; for since the union is not to be supremely loved, for it is a created good, then neither is the totality to be supremely loved that has its totality through that union.

55. Or it could be said that the act of loving regards distinctly the lovable nature just as does the act of not-loving, and in this way the totality is not supremely loved although it is adored with supreme adoration, because the adoration refers to the whole confusedly but love regards the distinct nature that is in the term of the act of loving. Or if the act of loving can tend toward the object as confusedly as the adoration can, one can concede that Christ - who has the thus lovable human nature - is to be supremely loved, although the human nature in him is not the reason for his supreme lovability, nor even the union of the human nature with the Word of whatever sort it is. For since we adore the Trinity with one adoration and love the Trinity with one love, not excluding the personal properties from the essence although these properties are not formally infinite, so too it is safe in loving not to distinguish the created nature too much from the Word, but to love the Word who subsists in both natures. And in this way the Word as possessing human nature can be loved supremely even though that nature itself is not supremely loved, as also neither is the union with the Word, which is something created, supremely loved; for it does not seem that someone should want to sin mortally lest the union not exist, since one should not sin mortally to save the being of any created thing; nor too would that union, precisely considered, beatify intellectual nature even though the term of the union would beatify, because the term is the infinite good and so is to be loved above all things.